Α. Administrative procedures and problems thousand which is the considered maximum limit of thirdcountry nationals residing in the country who preferred to enter illegally but “visibly” since the spring of 2015, does not appear to deviate upwards compared to the total illegal arrivals and stays in the country, especially after the drop since 2011 of the standard flows from Albania, but on the contrary is rather lower. This assessment is supported both by the stability in the arrests in 2016 on the Greek-Turkish border overall, and the decrease in the arrests in 2015-2016 on the mainland.17 According to estimates, illegally residents in the country are calculated at a maximum of 350 to 390 thousand, before and at the start of the financial crisis.18 Despite the fact that the estimates of the Greek Ombudsman’s members tend towards lower numbers, in any case, all estimates agree that up to 2011, a little under half of all irregular migrants were Albanian citizens. Both the crisis and the visa exemption for Schengen countries for Albanian citizens, the constant changes to the legislative framework from 2011 onwards, and the ascertained departure through Eidomeni of persons who had been “trapped”, led to a significant decrease of irregular migrants. From the available data of the Hellenic Police, since there has been no similar study since 2009,19 for example from the “stability” in the deportations of Albanian citizens we can presume with relative certainty that beyond the new arrivals since 2015, for which there are several reliable figures, the other irregular migrants have decreased significantly. From this aspect, the total administrative workload related to illegally residents or persons in the “grey zone of legality”, from the second quarter of 2016 to this day is exceptionally low, perhaps one of the lowest since 1990. This is not only an issue of the police authorities, but the entire Greek Administration and the related government structures, such as for example providers of health services, education, etc. The issue of the citizenship of arriving individuals An issue of particular importance having a political perspective, pertains to the percentage of Syrian citizens who were involved in this route. Beyond the possible thoughts that may arise regarding the triggering factors of the flows and the related explanations, it is interesting to see to what degree the actual regis17 See relevant data on the aforementioned website of the Hellenic Police. 18 http://irregular-migration.net/index.php?id=176 19 Only one update in 2012 (see footnote above) 18 tration reflected reality. The FRONTEX estimate is that in 2015 the registered third-country nationals who illegally crossed the borders into the Western Balkans were 35% Syrian citizens and 15% Afghanistan citizens. They were followed by Iraqis, Pakistanis and Iranians. All these together did not exceed 60% of the total flows into the Western Balkans.20 Based on the FRONTEX data, especially during the second half of 2015, around 38% are recorded as of unknown (“not specified”) citizenship. An issue therefore arises, inter alia, to what percentage individuals were registered by the Greek authorities as Syrian citizens when they actually were not. It is difficult to specify the exact number. Indicatively however, we mention that in 2015, among 173,074 Syrian citizens who went through screening and identification processes, 85.8% were verified to be Syrian citizens.21 To these, as a percentage of persons declaring false information, we must add a smaller percentage of those declaring to be Iraqis or other nationalities. There are no available data on how many of them were registered with wrong information in Greece, despite nearly all of them following the Eastern Mediterranean route and then the Western Balkan route. The FRONTEX data offer a new picture regarding the country of citizenship of those who crossed the borders, since the Syrian citizens who followed the Eastern Mediterranean route do not exceed 50% of the flows.22 The Syrians, as a nationality illegally crossing the borders on the Eastern Mediterranean route are now recorded at second place after the Afghanis, already from the second quarter of 2016 and onwards.23 The same picture is formed regarding the arrivals from Turkey towards Greece, as provided by the UNHCR based on the Hellenic Police and Hellenic Coast Guard data.24 In any case however, the great majority of new arrivals continue to this day to come from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq - countries with high asylum recognition rates. 20 These figures do not include data from the crossing of the borders from Turkey into Greece, but essentially the route from Greece and onwards. 21 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/jun/eu-frontex-west-balkans-riskanalysis.pdf, σ. 20 22 http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_2016_ Q2.pdf, statistical tables 23 http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/WB_Q2_2016.pdf, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/WB_Q3_2016.pdf 24 For the whole of 2016 see https://www.ecoi.net/file_ upload/1930_1485858949_greecefactsheetdecember-2016.pdf, p. 4