The following section contains characteristic incompatibilities in transposition of the CEAS in national legislation which were previously identified in IPA and are maintained in Asylum Code. Directive Directive 2011/95/EU Recast Qualification Directive Provision 29(1) Domestic law provision Article 29 Asylum Code . Directive 2013/32/EU Recast Asylum Procedures Directive 23(2) Article 23(4) in conjunction with Article 22(2) Asylum Code 31(8) Article 88(9)ia Asylum Code 38 (2) Article 91(1)f Asylum Code Non-transposition or incorrect transposition Article 29 Asylum Code maintaining previous relevant provisions transposing Article 29(1) Directive 2011/95/EU, foresees that beneficiaries have access to social welfare under the same conditions as Greek nationals. Though the letter of the law is positive and does not make use of derogations allowed under the Directive, conditions for accessing social benefits provided under Greece’s welfare policies and in particular requirements of previous legal stay for a minimum of 5 years that must be fulfilled, make it void in practice, leading to indirect discrimination against beneficiaries of international protection. In the case of families created after arrival to Greece: - in order for the spouses of the beneficiary to be eligible to be granted a residence permit they must already hold a valid residence permit at the time the marriage or civil partnership was conducted. - Furhtermore, parents of underage beneficiaries are not eligible for residence permits - While beneficiaries’ children need to have been born in Greece, in order to be eligible for a residence permit. Asylum Code maintains IPA’s provision (Article 83(9)) which exceeds the permissible grounds for applying the accelerated procedure, given that it foresees as ground for using the procedure cases where the applicant refuses to comply with the obligation to be fingerprinted under domestic legislation. Article 91(1)f Asylum Code maintains Article 86(1)(f) IPA, with regards the safe third country concept, and provides that transit through a third country may be considered as such a “connection” in conjunction with specific circumstances, on the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to go to that country. In LH the CJEU ruled that “the transit of the applicant from a third country cannot constitute as such a valid ground in order to be considered that the applicant could reasonably return in this country”, C-564/18 (19 March 2020), which 296