Detention as Punishment: Can indefinite detention be Greece's main policy tool to manage its irregular migrant population? by Anna Triandafyllidou, Angeliki Dimitriadi, Danai Angeli previous policy discouraged migrants from entering the country 18. On the other hand, its illegality added substantial political and financial costs for Greece. The first conviction by the European Court of Human Rights led Greece to pay a symbolic sum of 5000 euros to the victim19. Four more convictions led to a total of 48,000 euros in compensations,20 while more applications kept on arriving. In terms of political costs, Greece was the first State to be publicly condemned by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture for the ways it treated irregular migrants 21 and was obliged to put an end to this migration control policy under the watchful eye of the Council of Europe 22. Limited funds and absence of adequate facilities, combined with indefinite detention resulted in Greece being the first State towards which returns under the Dublin II Regulation were suspended. In particular, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece23 challenged the presumption of safety and of a level playing field in asίlum processing έithin the EU, έith the Court arguing against the idea that there is ‘per se a sufficient basis for intra-EU transfers of asίlum seekers’. It found that the dysfunctions of the Greek asylum system and the inhuman and degrading conditions of detention in the country violated articles 3 and 13 of the European Convention for Human Rights and deprived asylum seekers from their right to an effective remedy. This resulted, for the first time since the implementation of the Dublin II Regulation, in a suspension of transfers of asylum-seekers from other member states towards Greece. The broader implications of this decision were evident soon enough; Greece was pressured to dramatically overhaul its asylum system, reception conditions and broader practices in dealing with irregular migrants, a process that continues to this day. Given the profound arbitrariness of the latest policy measure, its short viability in terms of legality, the doubtfulness of its outcome, the big financial investment involved and the political risks of any new convictions, it is beyond doubt that this is not an effective and sustainable policy for Greece to manage its irregular migrant population. 18 For arrests in the period 20062013 see http://www.astynomia.gr/images/stories//2014/statistics14/allod2014/statistics_all_2014_01_ all&dia_apo2006.JPG . 19 See ECtHR, John v. Greece, Appl. No 199/05, Decision of 10 May 2007. 20 See ECtHR, S.D. v. Greece, Appl. No 53541/07, Judgment of 11 September 2009; A.A. v. Greece, Appl. no. 12186/08, Judgment of 22 July 2010; Tabesh v. Greece, Appl. no. 8256/07, Judgment of 26 November 2009; Rahimi v. Greece, Appl. No. 8687/08, Judgment of 5 April 2011. 21 See Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, “Public Statement concerning Greece”, 15 March 2011, aάailable at http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/grc/2011-10-inf-eng.htm 22 See Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 6 December 2012 at the 1157th Meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, “Resolution CM/ResDH(2012)183, Mohd and John against Greece, Execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights”, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-116545 . 23 ECtHR (GC), M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Appl. No. 30696/09, 21 Jan. 2011. 10