Pallister-Wilkins 995 understandings of humanitarian practice. Alongside this however Calhoun argues that humanitarianism has become increasingly instrumentalised as a way of managing global relations (2008). Calhoun’s focus on humanitarianism’s instrumentalisation in managing global relations does not go as far as Eyal Weizman’s argument concerning what he calls the ‘humanitarian present’ where humanitarian sentiment is a way of managing not only the contradictions of late-modern capitalism that produces and maintains a world of have and have-nots, but also structures and determines the limits of violence itself as opposed to acting as a sticking-plaster for violence (2012). Arguments about the current instrumentalisation of humanitarianism or the way violence is structured by and through humanitarianism remain somewhat limited spatially and temporally. For example, scholars of humanitarian sentiment in colonial practice, especially within the governing and expansion of the British Empire, argue cogently about the ways humanitarian sentiments of care worked to condition processes of control and structure practices of colonial violence (Laidlaw, 2012; Lester and Dussart, 2014). Building on scholars such as Fassin and Calhoun and, similar to those scholars who have traced the logics of humanitarianism in colonial practice, Reid-Henry has argued that what appears to be a paradox, or a contradiction between care and control in humanitarianism is in fact neither paradox nor contradiction (2014: 420). Reid-Henry argues that Foucault is useful for understanding humanitarianism’s ambivalence, as care and control are co-constitutive of the modern state that has sought to provide security and to govern in ever more efficient and productive ways (2014: 420). Most Foucauldian-inspired work on humanitarianism’s governmental rationality in policing mobility (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a; Ticktin, 2005) has focused on Foucault’s general work on biopolitics (2004) and security (2009). In focusing on humanitarianism’s imbrication within modern government, Reid-Henry suggests Foucault’s Omnes et Singulatim lecture from 1979 is more useful as it focuses on the way ‘the arts of government constitute not so much a form of “reason in general” as Foucault says “but always a very specific type of rationality”’ (2014: 421 quoting Foucault, 1979: 313). These specific rationalities according to Reid-Henry, and ones I believe are central to understanding the hotspots as humanitarian revolve around the sovereign will to care, or what Maurizio Albahari (2015) has recently called ‘sovereignty as responsibility’.5 In the context of my argument, these specific rationalities are: the effective management of disaster and the rationalisation of compassion. It is to a discussion of these specific rationalities I now turn. The effective management of disaster In the pre-modern era, disasters were contained. The state’s primary responsibility was to keep insecurity outside the walls. There is a comforting simplicity to this approach in analysing current European or EUropean border practices (Bialasiewicz, 2012) focused as it is on deterrence, expulsion and externalisation. The popular refrain ‘Fortress Europe’ evokes Europe’s attempts to contain disaster beyond its external borders. However, as recent Foucauldian influenced work on walling as a security practice has argued, seeing borders as blockades and walls as containers alone, fails to understand how they work as spaces and architectures of effective management (see Pallister-Wilkins, 2015b, 2016). This is not to argue that humanitarian concerns for life do not make use of specific technologies of containment in particular instances. Quarantine for example is a technique for the effective management of certain diseases. But even in quarantine, the focus is on effective and efficient management designed to reduce damages, control the distribution of risks and