For the latest measure to successfully pass the Convention test, first the detention conditions must improve and be brought in line with international standards. This by itself would require significant financial investment – way beyond the current budget. Even then, however, Greece would still be in violation of the Convention, because it would fail to meet the rest of the requirements that the Court has set. Greece therefore will be acting in violation also on this ground. “regularise” a detention that would otherwise find no support under the Greek law 17. Thus, Greece's very recent past in using detention as a main policy tool and trying to exceed the legal time-limits is a lesson to avoid, especially since there is little evidence that the previous policy discouraged migrants from entering the country18. On the other hand, its illegality added substantial political and financial costs for Greece. The first conviction by the European Court of Human Rights led Greece to pay a symbolic sum of 5000 euros to the victim19. Four more convictions led to a total of 48,000 euros in compensations,20 while more applications kept on arriving. In terms of political costs, Greece was the first State to be publicly condemned by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture for the ways it treated irregular migrants21 and was obliged to put an end to this migration control policy under the watchful eye of the Council of Europe22. Limited funds and absence of adequate Assessing the Cost and the Benefits Even though Greece has an undeniable sovereign right to control the number of aliens who enter and stay in its territory, it is also subject to its obligations under national, European and international law. Policy choices that are in violation of those obligations are not beneficial, because once their arbitrariness is judicially established their financial and political costs are higher than any initial short-term benefits. Until four years ago, migrants could be detained for the purpose of removal for up to three (3) months, while more specific provisions limited the use of detention to particular circumstances where deportation was feasible16. In practice however, police authorities systematically detained all arrested migrants and exceeded the time-limit, by issuing consecutively more than one deportation decisions for the same migrant, each one of which set into motion a separate deportation and detention procedure. This meant that a migrant who had just been released because his removal was not feasible, could be arrested on his/her way out of the detention facility, served with a new deportation decision and led back inside to serve another three months – sometimes within less than one hour. The arbitrariness of this practice was criticised by the Greek Ombudsman for seeking to 17 See Greek Ombudsman, «Πόοιρμα: Διαδξυικέπ Απξτάρειπ Απέλαρηπ», September 2006, available at http://www.synigoros.gr/resources/_porisma_apel asi_21_01.pdf . 18 For arrests in the period 2006- 2013 see http://www.astynomia.gr/images/stories//2014/st atistics14/allod2014/statistics_all_2014_01_all&dia _apo2006.JPG . 19 See ECtHR, John v. Greece, Appl. No 199/05, Decision of 10 May 2007. 20 See ECtHR, S.D. v. Greece, Appl. No 53541/07, Judgment of 11 September 2009; A.A. v. Greece, Appl. no. 12186/08, Judgment of 22 July 2010; Tabesh v. Greece, Appl. no. 8256/07, Judgment of 26 November 2009; Rahimi v. Greece, Appl. No. 8687/08, Judgment of 5 April 2011. 21 See Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, “Public Statement concerning Greece”, 15 March 2011, available at http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/grc/2011-10inf-eng.htm 22 See Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 6 December 2012 at the 1157th Meeting of the Ministers‟ Deputies, “Resolution CM/ResDH(2012)183, Mohd and John 16 See law No 2910/2001, Art. 44 par. 3; see also Law No 3772/2009 Art. 48 that entered into force on 8 July 2009 raising the limit to 6 months. 5