detainees increased significantly (AITIMA, 2016). In February 2016, the five long-delayed ‘hotspot’ centres opened on the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Leros, Samos, and Kos in order to cope with a relentless flow of people landing from Turkey (Antonakaki et al., 2016). Under the EU-Turkey deal, which came into force on 20 March 2016 (European Council, 2016), people arriving on the Greek islands were immediately detained for 20 days in these hotspots in order to be individually assessed by the Greek authorities. Following the 20 days’ period, they were released but had to remain on the island, thus further restricting their movement. Anyone who did not apply for asylum would be sent back to Turkey, as would anyone whose claim is rejected. Implementation of the deal has presented Greece with two challenges: first, the legal challenge of presenting Turkey as a safe third country in order to expedite returns. Second, to separate between those already trapped in Greece and new arrivals, as the fate of the former group is not addressed by the deal. As for the former, the Greek government amended its asylum legislation in a fast-track legislative procedure to modify the structure of the Asylum Appeals Committees, raising concerns about the independence and impartiality of the new body (for more on this see Gkliati, 2016). The latter challenge was addressed by emptying Greek islands of all those who crossed over from Turkey prior to the deal and transforming the much-vaunted open hotspots into massive police-run detention centres to host newcomers. The amended legal framework of first reception procedures (3907/2011) further clarifies that migrants were subject to restriction of freedom of movement within the premises of these centres. Within a few months, Greece was transformed from a fast lane to a grim waiting room. An article drawing on an investigation of Greece’s humanitarian response after 2015 describes a pattern of inertia, concealment of chaos, external pressure and last-minute actions, when it came to housing those who were stuck in Greece (Howden and Fotiadis, 2017). ‘Ask exactly how many refugee camps there are in Greece and no one is certain. Migration ministry bulletins list 39 camps, some of which are empty; others are mothballed and others still are in the planning phase but do not appear on the list. The UNHCR said there were more than 50, but did not give a specific number.’ (Howden and Fotiadis, 2017). Yet in addition to these new facilities, Greece continued to use a number of pre-removal detention centres, older dedicated detention facilities, and numerous border guard and police stations. For example, pre-removal detention centres like Amygdaleza and Corinth, the closure of which was celebrated in the presence of the media at the beginning of the government’s term of office, were re-opened. 118