buildings to transfer injured people and keep them out of sight. Actively neglecting the harm caused by detention and the way it was implemented in Greece from external observers, as well as withdrawing care and hampering aid (Loughnan, 2019), other than keeping the authorities physically and temporally remote from suffering, allowed the detention system to develop and thrive. In response to years of unmet medical and humanitarian needs (CPT 1997, 1999, 2001b, 2006, 2007, 2008), two types of interventions were the direct outcome of the ‘violent consequences of state inaction’ (Davies et al., 2017, p. 1263); the self-funded, which covered mainly the activities of international organisations, such as the MSF, UNHCR, etc., and the government funded ones, which applied to NGOs receiving a combination of state and EU funding. While the former had a limited timeframe with advocacy as the core objective, the latter sought to cover the vast protection gaps left by the state (Skleparis, 2015). The gradual and limited involvement of external monitoring organisations went hand-inhand with the expansion project of detention sites; thus, reinforcing sub-contracting relationships between state and non-state actors. Indeed, from 2008 until 2013, service provision inside detention was heavily reliant on non-governmental organisations; a move, which was unprecedented both for them and the authorities. Civil society had no previous experience with detained populations and the authorities did not want any outsiders to upset the status quo they had tried so hard to establish the years before. As the deputy head of the administrative district of Thrace put it ‘the focus should not be on bringing more organisations to the Evros region, but simply to stop migrants from arriving’ (Schaub, 2013). The hesitation to bring in more actors could explain why the expansive tendencies of the NGO sector in Greece, especially after 2015, has not been reflected at all in the detention sector. In fact, funding for the provision of services inside detention centres has always been trickling down. Compared to the other more generous EC financial instruments, like the Return and External Borders Funds, as the previous chapter has highlighted, the amount available through the European Refugee Fund (ERF), which was meant to support organisations providing services to refugees, for the years 2007-2013, 39.9 million Euros, was strikingly low. Complicating matters, rules around use of ERF funding allowed for a broader interpretation of what could be funded, giving way to the government to use it for the construction or refurbishment of detention centres too; thus, dwindling its already meager support systems for detained populations. What is more, UNHCR, one of the 155