Slingenberg 389 (primarily the right to respect for private life in Article 8 and the right to freedom of movement in Article 2 of Protocol 4; Ruiz Ramos, 2024a; Slingenberg, 2022; Wessels, 2023). In addition, if the confinement in the Greek reception centres can be qualified as deprivation of liberty, the safeguards laid down in EU law for detention would apply. This would mean, for example, that the deprivation of liberty can no longer be imposed as a general rule on all newly arrived asylum seekers, but that an individual assessment is required (Article 8(2) Directive 2013/33/EU); that the detention should be ordered in writing (Article 9 (2) Directive 2013/33/EU); that there should be speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of the detention (Article 9(3) Directive 2013/33/EU); repetition of that review at reasonable intervals of time (Article 9(5) Directive 2013/ 33/EU); and access to free legal assistance and representation (Article 9(6) Directive 2013/33/EU). Hence, these safeguards further complement the procedural safeguards laid down in Article 5 ECHR. As the situation of asylum seekers in reception centres is not entirely similar to cases of classic arrest and detention – they are, after all, allowed to leave the centres every day – the question needs to be addressed whether this situation entails deprivation of liberty or a mere restriction on liberty. In answering that question, the ECtHR generally holds that the difference between deprivation of liberty and restrictions on liberty of movement ‘is merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance’. In order to determine whether someone has been deprived of his liberty, ‘the starting-point must be his specific situation and account must be taken of a whole range of factors such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question’ (Stanev v Bulgaria 2012: para 115). In the 2019 Grand Chamber cases of Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary and Z.A. and others v. Russia, both decided on the same day, the Court (re)formulated the relevant criteria for determining the distinction between a restriction on liberty of movement and deprivation of liberty ‘in the context of confinement of foreigners in airport transit zones and reception centres for the identification and registration of migrants’. In this context, the approach must be ‘practical and realistic’, according to the Court, and must recognize the States’ ‘right, subject to their international obligations, to control their borders and to take measures against foreigners circumventing restrictions on immigration’ (Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, 2019: para 213). The relevant factors as regards the confinement of migrants are: 1. 2. 3. 4. the applicants’ individual situation and their choices; the applicable legal regime of the respective country and its purpose the relevant duration, especially in the light of the purpose and the procedural protection enjoyed by applicants pending the events; and the nature and degree of the actual restrictions imposed on or experienced by the applicants. (para 217) As regards the first factor, the Court found it relevant that applicants entered a centre of their own initiative, with the aim of seeking asylum. ‘While this fact in itself does not exclude the possibility of the applicants finding themselves in a situation of de facto