Slingenberg 395 To be sure, I do not argue that every stay in a semi-open centre amounts to detention or deprivation of liberty. However, we could use the notion of subsistence exchange contracts to argue that the semi-open character of a centre should not automatically disqualify the situation as detention or deprivation of liberty. Taking into account the involuntary character of asylum seekers’ return to and stay in such centres every evening and night, the other criteria for establishing a deprivation of liberty should be assessed, similar to cases about transit centres. Accordingly, if complying with a curfew in a centre can be qualified as a subsistence exchange contract, because asylum seekers trade away their freedom in return for basic subsistence, then account needs to be taken of other relevant criteria for establishing a deprivation of liberty, such as the duration of the confinement to the centre and the procedural protection (e.g. whether domestic law specifies a maximum duration) and the nature and degree of the actual restrictions imposed on or experienced by the applicants (e.g. size of the area and the manner in which it was controlled). In light of the continuous and intense supervision and control (using CCTV, X-ray, fingerprints, barbed wire and a lot of security staff) of the residents of the new Greek camps, their isolated location, the impossibility of leaving the islands and the absence of a maximum duration of confinement to these camps, the sum of all these conditions could in that case very well point towards the conclusion that the situation should be qualified as deprivation of liberty. As discussed in the introduction, curfews are often used to control certain categories of people, and fit the broader trend of excluding persons from public space. An important question is what kind of legal protection is available against such a measure of social control. This article shows that for answering that question, account must be taken of the entire context of the measure. If curfews are enacted as part of a containment policy that confines people in collective accommodation centres, the right to liberty could provide important legal protection. If, as argued in this article, the right to liberty applies to the containment measures, it would mean that such measures must be based on one of the limited number of acceptable grounds for a deprivation of liberty as laid down in Article 5 ECHR; they need to have a proper domestic legal basis (which, as the contributions in this issue by Leroy (2024) and Ruiz Ramos (2024b) show, requires a detailed and in-depth analysis of the domestic legal framework); and there should be prompt access to a judge for every individual subjected to the measures. In addition, the partly more far-reaching procedural safeguards laid down in EU law for the detention of asylum seekers would apply. That would not mean that such measures are necessarily unlawful, but it would more effectively constrain the power of the state, which is crucial for the maintenance of the rule of law (Slingenberg, 2020). This would prevent states from sidelining fundamental safeguards as regards the legality and accountability of their containment policies by simply authorizing asylum seekers to leave the centre a couple of hours per day, while the purpose of their policies (i.e. containment and isolation of asylum seekers) stays intact. In addition, it would ensure a better alignment between the human rights law framework and the lived experiences of asylum seekers, which increases human rights law’s legitimacy.