indeed discouraged from applying, since they are informed that detention time starts once more from zero, once they apply for asylum and until a final decision is reached on their application. Deterrence is not a standalone policy. In fact, it is complimented by return and increasingly linked with “voluntary” return, procedure initiated during detention often with the assistance of IOM, whereby the migrant is presented with the alternative to “go home” or remain in detention while his/her asylum claim is processed or travel documents are issued for removal. Because voluntary return means the migrant cooperates and embassies tend to also be more cooperative (when the individual wishes to return), it is also a more expedient process; however it has raised criticism as to what an extent it is “voluntary” and how “sustainable” is the return (or whether the migrant re-migrates upon return). There is a common agreement among scholars and NGOs that using detention in its disciplinary and punishment dimension is increasingly common in European countries. Relevant studies and NGO experiences documented in Forced Migration Review (fall 2013) note that there is a pressing need for assessing the costs (both direct in terms of lodging and policing detained people, and indirect in terms of the damage inflicted to these people whose only crime is to have crossed the country‟s borders unauthorized and/or having applied for asylum) of detention. In addition, the costs of detention need to be examined more closely. Recent studies5 have shown that Italy is spending a minimum of 55 million Europe per year for the functioning of its CIE centres (Centres for Identification and Expulsion). In the period between 1998 and 2012 nearly 170,000 individuals have been “hosted” at CIE but only 46.2% of them have been effectively removed from the Italian territory. In addition the Italian government has invested in the period 2005-2012 a total sum of 1.668 billion Euros (of which 1.3 billion contributed by the Italian state and 281.3 million from EU funds) with a dubious success in limiting the phenomenon of irregular migration. In addition the studies show that there is a lack of transparency on how policies are implemented and how money is spent. There is a lack of evaluation and assessment of the activities conducted and the expenses sustained. In addition under the current Spending Review, the funds available for the CIE have been reduced further jeopardising the quality of life and the respect of the basic human rights of people detained there. As Claire de Senarclens argues4 immigration detention is usually thought of as a way to facilitate the removal of illegally staying foreign nationals. However it is useful to distinguish between administrative detention, mainly aiming at guaranteeing that the individual is present when it comes to the execution of their removal, and the disciplinary function of detention, when it is thought of as an instrument of coercion for forcing people to cooperate for the purpose of their own removal. Indeed the distinction may be subtle but is real. There is a third type of detention: detention as sanction for having crossed the border unauthorized and/or for seeking asylum. This punishment dimension is used by governments to deter prospective irregular migrants from entering their territory or asylum seekers from applying for international protection. The latter is related to the view that applying for asylum actually stalls the removal procedure until the application is processed (which in countries like Greece for instance may take several years). The Greek authorities have so far failed to consider let alone implement alternative measures such as community integration of asylum seeking or irregular migrants awaiting 5 For more details see http://www.lunaria.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/SINTESI_COSTIDISUMANI_ def.pdf and http://www.wisslab.dirpolis.sssup.it/files/2013/06/Libro-dirpolisita.pdf 4 See Forced Migration Review, fall 2013, Issue 44, page 60. 2