The purpose of this new policy is straightforward: to secure that all irregular migrants — unless
granted international protection — will be returned to their home countries. Faced with the
deprivation of their liberty and without the hope of a timely release, the Greek authorities believe
that migrants will be forced to co-operate and accept a so called “voluntary” [assisted] return or
indeed a forced return to their country of origin. Greece will thus succeed in reducing the overall size
of its irregular migrant population. At the same, this new policy is expected to act as a deterrent
since it will “send a strong signal to third-country nationals willing to illegally enter Greece,” and
“warn all immigrants who do not fall under the status of international protection that they will be
arrested, detained and returned to the countries of origin”.11
Greece's decision to manage irregular migration by using indiscriminate and lengthy detention as the
predominant policy tool is not pioneering; past similar efforts however have shown that mass and
lengthy detention is a very costly enterprise and does not guarantee better results than its less costly
alternatives.12 Unsurprisingly, in the last three years crisis-stricken Greece has repeatedly appealed
to the other Member States for solidarity and financial support. The EU has so far agreed to co-fund
this latest policy experiment without challenging Greece's position, which is under pressure to deal
with a sharply decreasing but still noticeable volume of irregular arrivals (as counted by the related
apprehensions at the country’s sea and land borders with Turkey).
Table 1: Greek-Turkish border apprehensions: 2008-2013
Border areas
Land Border
Sea Border
Total Apprehensions
Source: Ministry
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013*
14,461
8,787
47,088
54,974
30,433
585
30,149
27,685
6,204
1,030
3,651
5,579
44,610
36,472
52,269
56,004
34,084
6,834
of Public Order & Citizen Protection, (2012). * Data for Jan-Aug 2013.
It goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the overall policies of Greece in combating irregular
migration (see for instance Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011) for a critical perspective 13. We would
like however to cast light here to an aspect of Greece’s irregular migration policy that has been
under-researched; notably the costs and effectiveness of detention, thus contributing to assessing the
effectiveness of this migration control measure. It is our contention that investing heavily in a policy
with no proven effectiveness, a huge financial cost and an equally high human rights cost is, at best,
an ill-advised decision. Alternatives that are less costly and more effective do exist and Greece must
11
12
13
See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Mission to Greece, 18
April 2013, p. 11, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/SRMigrants/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx .
See International Detention Coalition and La Trobe Refugee Research Centre Report “There are
alternatives: a handbook for preventing unnecessary immigration detention”, 2011, available
at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/Events/IDC.pdf ; See Report by Council
of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, “Migration and asylum:
mounting tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean”, 23 January 2013, available at
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=19349&Language=en ; see UNHCR
Guidelines on the applicable criteria and standards relating to the detention of asylum-seekers
and alternatives to detention, 2012, available at http://www.unhcr.org/505b10ee9.html .
See A, Triandafyllidou and M. Ambrosini, “Irregular Migration Control in Italy and Greece: stong
fencing and weak gate-keeping serving the labour market”, European Journal of Migration and
Law (2011), Vol. 13, pp. 251- 273.
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