views that, under the strict standards of European anti-hate speech law, would be subject to prosecution. As a matter of fact, a few months ago, when the adoption of an anti-hate speech law was under discussion in Greece, Greek Orthodox priests were all over private TV talk shows, trying to convince the public and the believers that “nobody can contain God’s speech”. At the same time, it is interesting to note that the archbishop has not opposed the prospect of such legislation introduced to Greek law, and would most likely be relieved to welcome a few restrictions on the public speech of certain Greek bishops. The special position of the Greek Orthodox Church within the Greek State and its close ties with public authorities have not served as a factor of self-censorship against stating such views and reproducing such ideological perceptions within the Church, and have instead functioned in a rather unforeseen way. In making full use of the privileges accorded to them, Church oicials actually feel empowered to speak out on just about any political matter in sometimes surprisingly interventionist ways. The decentralized administrative model of the Greek Orthodox Church (at least compared to the Roman Catholic church) enables individual Church oicials not only to say practically whatever they like, but also to form coalitions with ultra-right political strategies, either because they feel this is a good way to consolidate their presence and power among the clergy, or simply because they really think this is the right thing to do. The result is that some Greek priests have successfully claimed a vital space within political discourse from which they do not underplay but consciously uphold an ultra-right political orientation. In this sense, the speech of the Church is very easy to penetrate, because it does not bother to hide. On the other hand, a very diferent situation evidently obtains with the police, and even more so with the military and the judiciary. Obviously, one should not expect Greek judges to manifestly express their political beliefs, especially when these follow ultra-right patterns. This does not happen and normally could not happen in Greece, although there are some unfortunate exceptions in this sphere as well. What does happen and is worthy of consideration and study is that within the judiciary there is a constant and systematic reproduction of practices and judgments that are especially favourable to the consolidation of an ultra-right political culture and ideology, and emphatically disseminate it within society. The most crucial issue is not the ideological crystallization of extremely reactionary normative judgments and their systematic pronouncement; in the inal analysis, this could be also attributed to the conservative functions performed by any judicial system, anywhere and at any time. The problem is that both in cases that are emblematic for the Greek society and political system, and in cases that are publicly irrelevant, the judiciary seems to increasingly slide towards judgments that reproduce dominant nationalist and racist views in a punitive way. The counter-argument here is that one should not expect judges not to be “ordinary people”, since such views are widespread in Greece across the political spectrum, and not just in ultra-right settings. In any case, judges are people too and are entitled to have the views that they prefer. The fact that some of them endorse racist views and pronounce racist judgments is naturally of concern. But the most interesting thing is not what judges think, but that some judges make their own ideology into a normative rule, more oten than not in a blatant and partial way, favouring one side of the political 6 | ROSA LUXEMBURG STIFTUNG