Graduate Journal of Social Science, Volume 15, Issue 1 small group of border crossers is left outside of the ‘cage-port’ gazing at the ferry travelling to Athens. They, too, had no luck today - like so many other border crossers who have been stranded within an enormous geographical, physical and psychological limbo for many months by moving here and there, back and forward on a daily basis; from Moria, Kara Tepe and PIKPA camps to Mytilene, sometimes on foot, sometimes by bus or taxi. This is what the internalisation of the borders looks like, I was thinking. In 2003 a policy paper under the name “A New Vision for Refugees”, which included Tony Blair’s vision concerning the management of the irregular migration flows within Europe, emerged (Travis, 2003). This was Blair’s proposal at the EU -Thessaloniki Summit about the establishment of a regime of “Regional Protection Areas” or “Protection Zones” or “Safe Havens”, as well as Transit Processing Centres (TPCs) for border crossers on transit routes on Europe (Amnesty International, 2003; Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Noll, 2015; Travis, 2003). Blair’s ambivalent scheme would involve denial of entry to “asylum seekers” and “economic migrants” by returning them to the “Safe Havens”, meaning to countries outside the EU and close to migrants’ homelands (Johnston, 2003; Noll, 2015; Travis, 2003). “Safe Haven” countries would serve as a containment for border crossers arriving for the first time there, for deportee border crossers from other EU countries, as well as containment for returning border crossers, for possible resettlement in the EU (Antonakaki, Kasparek, & Maniatis, 2016; Hess & Kasparek, 2017, p. 63; Kuster & Tsianos, 2016). According to Jennifer Hyndman, the notion of “safe spaces” is not something new. It is a post-Cold War phenomenon which was applied in 1991 in Northern Iraq and also Haiti and Rwanda (Hyndman, 2003; Long, 2013). “Safe Havens” reflect the deliberate political intention of a “preventive protection” (Hyndman, 2003, p. 168), meaning the provision of humanitarian relief as far away as possible, within or closer to displaced population’ countries (Long, 2013). This demonstrates the determination of policymakers “to bring safety to people rather than people to safety, by force if necessary” (Newland in Hyndman, 2003, p. 169). What took place in practice in the aftermath of the refugee crisis was, in Miriam Ticktin’s words, an “armed love” process (Ticktin, 2016) within the borders, an overwhelming spectacle of “protective” militarised and humanitarian response. The “armed love” process involved, instead of international protection, enormous securitisation, the militarisation of the borders and governance of irregularised border crossing. It also involved a process of externalisation and, at the same time, internalisation; namely a 9 (Unformatted version, page numbers not final)