The recast of the directive was adopted in 2013 (Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU)26 which amended the Directive to include provisions on detention. Article 8(3) of the recast RCD provides an exhaustive list of six grounds for detaining asylum seekers.27 Within this context, centres for the identification and detention of migrants have proliferated across the EU over the past three decades.28 Between the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, many of these centres grew larger and more sophisticated.29 Between 1999 and 2011, the capacity of Italy’s national detention system expanded from fewer than 1,000 beds to 1,900 beds.30 Meanwhile, immigration detention expanded in Norway as well, a trend described by researchers Synnove and Thomas Ugelvik as resulting from immigration’s newfound status as “an issue perpetually at or near the top of the political agenda”.31 In the UK, immigration removal centres with capacity for up to 448 people are either privatised, and therefore overseen by profit-driven companies including G4S,32 Serco33 and Clearsprings,34 or managed by the national prison service.35 The so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016 marked another critical moment in the detention of migrants in Europe.36 From 2010 until 2016, detention in many EU Member States had either plateaued or declined, with public opinion that was disturbed by the reported conditions in many detention centres.37 For example, 2,982 migrants were taken into custody in Italy in 2016, as compared to 12,112 in 2009.38 Meanwhile, by 2016, only 4 detention facilities operated in the country, as compared to 13 in 2010.39 However, after 2016 and the ”summer of migration,” the number of detention facilities in some European countries began to rise again, as humanitarian concerns gave way to “the need to prevent ‘secondary movements’ of asylum seekers.40 This was particularly true in border regions. For example, by mid-2018, six detention facilities with a total capacity for 880 beds were operating in Italy.41 The sudden increase of people seeking asylum at the EU’s external borders, coupled with the various restric26 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection. 27 Peek/Tsourdis in Hailbronner/Thym EU Immigration and Asylum Law, Part D.V. para 117, p.1443. 28 Alberti 2010: 139, Lydi Arbogast, Migrant Detention in the European Union: a Thriving Business, Migreurop ( July 2016), available at: https://bit.ly/3khGSfW. 29 Lydi Arbogast, Migrant Detention in the European Union: a Thriving Business, Migreurop ( July 2016), 2, available at: https://bit. ly/3khGSfW. 30 Giuseppe Campesi & Giulia Fabini, Immigration Detention as Social Defence: Policing ‘Dangerous Mobility’ in Italy, Theoretical Criminology 24 (2020) 2. 31 Synnove Ugelvik & Thomas Ugelvik, Immigration control in Ultima Thule: Detention and exclusion, Norwegian Style, European Journal of Criminology 10(6) (2013), 710. 32 Jamie Grierson, Serco given £200m contract to run two more immigration removal centres, The Gurdian (20 February 2020), available at: https://bit.ly/3yr1JCM. 33 Serco, Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre, available at: https://bit.ly/3gNaHnZ. 34 Rob Davies, Firm running asylum-seeker barracks in Kent standst o earn £1bn, The Guardian (3 Feb 2021), available at: https://bit. ly/38stpMZ. 35 GOV.UK, Morton Hall Immigration Removal Centre, available at: https://bit.ly/3t1oBHS. 36 Giuseppe Campesi & Giulia Fabini, Immigration Detention as Social Defence: Policing ‘Dangerous Mobility’ in Italy, Theoretical Criminology 24 (2020) 52. 37 Majcher et al: 2 38 Giuseppe Campesi & Giulia Fabini, Immigration Detention as Social Defence: Policing ‘Dangerous Mobility’ in Italy, Theoretical Criminology 24 (2020) 52. 39 Ibid. 40 Majcher et al: 2 41 Giuseppe Campesi & Giulia Fabini, Immigration Detention as Social Defence: Policing ‘Dangerous Mobility’ in Italy, Theoretical Criminology 24 (2020) 53. 2 DETENTION OF MIGRANTS ON THE ISLAND OF KOS