Cheliotis and Xenakis 81 with heightened sensitivities to issues of punishment, often as a result of direct or indirect experience of punitive treatment at the hands of authoritarian regimes in the past, be it in the form of imprisonment, exile or torture (or a combination of those). In addition, while Syriza was still in the opposition, several eminent members of the party regularly mobilised to help bring about progressive changes to carceral conditions or, indeed, a shift towards decarceration: from visiting carceral sites to inspect them firsthand, to taking to the streets to participate in protests against known gross violations of the rights of incarcerated populations, to using mainstream and other media platforms to sensitise the broader public and to force sitting parties to consider taking liberalising measures. In this broader context, Syriza also openly campaigned in favour of highprofile prisoners with known political leanings towards the Left. To take the most wellknown example, in late 2013 the party issued a public statement in support of Savvas Xiros, a nearly blind and almost deaf amputee serving multiple life sentences for offences related to his involvement in the Revolutionary Organisation November 17, who was at the time applying for suspension of his imprisonment on grounds of ill health (see, further, Cheliotis, 2012; Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2016). Such actions were typically met with sustained criticism from parties in the centre and, even more so, on the right end of the political spectrum, purportedly for showing softness on crime and a sympathising stance towards terrorism. Syriza nevertheless proceeded to give carceral moderation, and at least in part also abolition, high visibility in its campaign for the election held in January 2015. Propagated under slogans such as ‘Hope is on the Way’ and ‘First Time Left’, Syriza’s manifesto comprised a long series of promises bound together by a concern for redressing what it described as widespread injustice and restoring dignity, especially for the most disadvantaged. Promises were clustered around three policy domains: the first, as suggested earlier, was economy and society, starting with debt restructuring, which would in turn facilitate an end to austerity and help enhance welfare provision for the poorest families; the second was public administration, with a particular focus on tackling corruption and unnecessary red tape; and the third was human rights, ranging from the legalisation of same-sex marriage and the introduction of laws to protect minorities from hate speech and criminal victimisation, to an array of reforms relating, whether directly or indirectly, to incarceration. These last reforms spanned reducing the prison population, abolishing the maximum-security prisons programme that the previous government had introduced towards the end of its tenure, providing second-generation migrants with citizenship, expediting the asylum application process, putting an end to the systematic and arbitrary detention of undocumented migrants, and replacing closed administrative detention centres with open facilities (see, further, Douzinas, 2017; Tsakatika, 2016). Optimism was further fuelled in the immediate aftermath of the election and the formulation of a coalition government headed by Syriza, at which point several ministerial positions were filled by people with personal or family histories of political resistance and subjection to punishment under the Colonels’ dictatorship. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice (and with it the responsibility for prison policy) was allocated to Nikos Paraskevopoulos, a criminal law professor with a long-term interest in prisoners’ rights, and the post of Alternate Minister for Migration Policy (which included responsibility for immigration detention matters) was given to Tasia Christodoulopoulou, a respected lawyer and human rights activist.