Carceral moderation and the Janus face of international pressure 53 to contravene both ECHR obligations and broader international human rights legislation. With regard to immigration detention conditions as such, the international realm has even practically operated as a driver of Greek non-compliance with the ECHR, insofar as the EU has effectively fuelled overcrowding and associated problems, not least by continuing to channel large flows of irregular migration to Greece. In sum, contrary to concerns that have been raised in scholarship on the effectiveness of international human rights regimes about the validity of causal attribution per se, our account coheres with, and provides further validation to, approaches to causation which argue not only that the identification of causal factors is a legitimate endeavour, but also that different causal factors may be inextricably bound together in a relationship of mutual constitution and cumulative efficacy (see, e.g., [85]). What this implies is that efforts to explain national propensity towards compliance with an international human rights regime need to extend beyond considering single sets of variables (e.g., domestic capacity limitations), just as they need to extend beyond considering single variables within given sets (e.g., pro-compliance international pressures). In so doing, moreover, the possibility needs to be considered that different variables within a particular set may exert opposing and even counter-productive effects, as our account of both pro- and counter-compliance influences stemming from the international sphere reveals. References 1. Krasner, S. (1982). Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables. International Organization, 36(2), 185–205. 2. Nadelmann, E. (1990). Global prohibition regimes: The evolution of norms in international society. International Organization, 44(4), 479–526. 3. Krasner, S. (1999). Sovereignty: Organized hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 4. Smith, K. E. (2015). The EU as a diplomatic actor in the field of human rights. In J. Koops & G. Macaj (Eds.), The European Union as a diplomatic actor (pp. 155–177). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 5. Risse, T., & Ropp, S. C. (2013). Introduction and overview. In T. Risse, S. C. Ropp, & K. Sikkink (Eds.), The persistent power of human rights: From commitment to compliance (pp. 3–25). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Knaus, G. (2015a). Dorian Grey in Europe: The end of shame and human rights. Newsletter 6/2015, European Stability Initiative. Available online at: http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=67 &newsletter_ID=93. Accessed 8 Nov 2016. 7. Knaus, G. (2015b). Europe and Azerbaijan: The end of shame. Journal of Democracy, 26(3), 5–18. 8. UN Watch (2016). Again: Saudi Arabia Elected Chair of UN Human Rights Panel. September 20. Available online at: https://www.unwatch.org/again-saudis-elected-chair-of-un-human-rights-councilpanel/. Accessed 26 Dec 2016. 9. Cardenas, S. (2007). Conflict and compliance: State responses to international human rights pressures. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 10. Anagnostou, D., & Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2014). Domestic implementation of human rights judgments in Europe: Legal infrastructure and government effectiveness matter. European Journal of International Law, 25(1), 205–227. 11. Hillebrecht, C. (2014b). The power of human rights tribunals: Compliance with the European court of human rights and domestic policy change. European Journal of International Relations, 20(4), 1100–1123. 12. Friman, H. R. (2015). Conclusion: Exploring the politics of leverage. In H. R. Friman (Ed.), The politics of leverage in international relations: Name, shame and sanction (pp. 201–218). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 13. Nye, J. (1990). The changing nature of world power. Political Science Quarterly, 105(2), 177–192. 14. Lebovic, J., & Voeten, E. (2009). The cost of shame: International organizations and foreign aid in the punishing of human rights violators. Journal of Peace Research, 46(1), 79–97.