Carceral moderation and the Janus face of international pressure
49
corruption have generated amongst the broader public; disaffection that has become all
the more pervasive and acute since the financial crisis hit Greece in 2009 and harsh
austerity measures ensued to meet the requirements of successive bailouts. In particular,
the widely publicised intensification in the use of both conventional imprisonment and
immigration detention has helped to deflect and appease a range of anxieties and
frustrations amongst lower- and middle-class segments of the population, from heightened concerns relating to personal and family finances, to increased anger with political
elites, to a spreading sense of national humiliation before foreign audiences [30, 64, 65].
In this case, the notoriously harsh conditions of penal and administrative detention have
not just facilitated the symbolic resolution of anger diverted against out-groups
scapegoated as dangerous. In accordance with what may be termed the ‘more eligibility’
principle, they have also become a rare source of empowerment for average Greek
citizens, helping subconsciously to alleviate their pains of downward mobility and
falling living standards by providing them with reassurance that they continue to enjoy
material advantages at least over those on the margins of society–and over some foreign
population at that, given the racialisation of custodial prisons and the proliferation of
immigration detention sites around the country (see further [43, 62]).
From a domestic politico-economic perspective, then, bringing carceral conditions
in line with the ECHR must have been taken to be of insufficient utility at best, whilst
risking serious counterproductive effects at worst. Indeed, repeated criticisms and
sanctions for non-compliant conditions of incarceration have arguably been perversely
useful to the status quo insofar as they have subtly worked as powerful reminders that
bolster feelings of intimidation and labour exploitability amongst those occupying the
bottom of the class structure, at the same time as helping to reaffirm a sense of relative
superiority amongst the mainstream public. Given the exceptionally high levels of
nationalism, racism and punitiveness against foreign lawbreakers amongst Greeks
(including amongst the judiciary), the fact that migrants have come to be the primary
targets of state punitiveness in the country appears closely interrelated with the fact that
successive governments have failed to comply with ECHR provisions regarding
conditions of imprisonment and immigrant detention (see further [43, 62, 64]).
International drivers of Greek non-compliance
In addition to domestic politico-economic rationales, there have also been certain
international pressures that have functioned to impede Greek compliance with the
ECHR. The existence and role of international drivers of national non-compliance is
exemplified in the crisis that has unfurled over recent years concerning conditions of
immigration detention in Greece.
As a starting point, Greece’s European counterparts have played a key role in making
contravention of ECHR provisions on conditions of detention practically more likely. First,
EU migration and border security policies bear considerable responsibility for the magnitude
of irregular flows of migrants that have become concentrated in Greece, given, on one hand,
the European Community’s longstanding efforts to tighten regular migration routes into the
region [66], and on the other hand, the area’s so-called Dublin regime, which has meant that,
since 1997, immigrants apply for regularisation in their first country of entry to the EU.
EU migration management has continued to channel irregular migrants to Greece
despite awareness of the poor and worsening conditions of immigrant detention in the
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