ANGELIKI DIMITRIADI to Athens or Thessaloniki. The large majority aimed to reach the mainland in an effort to continue their journey to northern Europe. Registration serves multiple purposes. It can facilitate Dublin returns to Greece, since arrivals are recorded in the EURODAC10. It can also assist with relocation. The idea of relocation of those already on EU territories is defined under the EU Agenda (European Commission, 2015b). In solidarity with frontline States, the Commission proposed triggering the emergency response system envisaged under Article 78(3) of the EU Treaty (ibidem). Redistribution of persons in need of international protection would mean suspension of Dublin rules. As early as September 2015, the Commission announced an emergency relocation scheme11 of 120,000 persons in need of international protection from Greece and Italy. Following the establishment of the relocation scheme, agencies in the hotspots were asked to identify people who could participate in relocation (including, notably, Syrians, Iraqis, and Eritreans). Needless to say, relocation from the hotspots never took off, since the facilities quickly changed their role in connection to the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016. The Statement emerged in a politically polarised environment and was portrayed as a complementary solution to the closure of the Western Balkan route. The Statement should not be treated as exceptional or unique12. It is consistent with the past decade of EU migration management policy, that consists in outsourcing and externalising responsibility at the front-line states and in neighbouring third countries (Triandafyllidou, Dimitriadi, 2014; Dimitriadi, 2016a). The EU-Turkey Statement prescribes the return to Turkey of all new arrivals after 20 March who either opt out of asylum, or whose applications are deemed inadmissible. It also introduces a 1+1 Scheme, whereby for every Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU. The Statement also requires that Greece ceases transfers from the islands to the mainland, a measure criticized as a «pull factor» for arrivals. Deterrence, according to a field officer interviewed, begins prior to border crossing since «if the migrants know they will be unable to move forward, they will consider twice before crossing to Greece» (July 2016, Lesvos). What is unique about the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 is the impact it has had on the islands hosting the hotspots and on the migrants stranded on them. The hotspots have become the main tool to implement and sustain the Statement. x 10 Dublin mechanism was suspended for Greece since 2011; however the expressed will of the Commission was that eventually the rule would be reinstated for Greece. 11 For details see European Commission, 9 September 2015, Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-155596_en.htm. 12 In the past, Spain and Italy have successfully undertaken bilateral agreements with Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal and Libya respectively. The EU-Turkey Statement resembles to an extent the Italian-Libyan agreement of 2012 in seeking to deter border crossings prior to them taking place, and in offering incentives to the third countries to beef up border controls and maintain the asylum-seeking population in the country. – 80 –