indiscriminately been further subjected to an ever prolonged restriction of freedom on the islands (after the 25 days). To be noted, in the context of this limitation of their freedom, asylum seekers are, in theory, freely allowed to enter-exit their respective RICs’ premises.66 During our visits in both Lesvos and Kos, however, the following issue came to our attention. Namely, despite applicants’ alleged freedom to move within the islands following their initial detention, this “freedom” is practically unattainable for the vast majority of them. For starters, public transportation on both islands was only available for limited hours and never available during afternoon and/or night hours. Transportation, furthermore, was for all intents and purposes unaffordable on a consistent basis, as the financial allowance provided to applicants remains marginally sufficient to cater even to some of their most basic needs (e.g. private healthcare, which forms a necessity due to ongoing gaps in the publicly-provided one, or clothes). Lastly, the number of available buses and the number of routes performed throughout their limited daily schedule between the RICs and other locations, were in no way sufficient to cover the hundreds (in Kos) and thousands (in Lesvos) of trapped asylum seekers, who were thus ultimately, albeit indirectly, forced to “enjoy” their freedom within the premises and/or surrounding areas of the respective RICs.67 Therefore, it needs to be emphasized that despite their nominal non-detention on the islands, the vast majority of asylum seekers are still trapped under conditions highly similar to those of detention. It is not to wonder, then, why the Greek “hotspot” islands have been characterized as “open prisons”.68 “[The] Distinction between deprivation of liberty (detention) and lesser restrictions on movement is one of “degree or intensity and not one of nature or substance”.69 33 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Detention Guidelines: Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention’, refworld [website], 2012, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/503489533b8.html>, last accessed 20 March 2018. 34 Article 8(2), Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast). 35 Indicatively, see Council of Europe: Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), Report to the Greek Government on the visits to Greece carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 13 to 18 April and 19 to 25 July 2016 [website], 26 September 2017, pp.16-17, <https://rm.coe.int/pdf/168074f85d>, last accessed 20 March 2018 and Walter-Franke, M., ‘Asylum Detention in Europe: State of Play and Ways Forward’, Jacques Delors Institut, Policy Paper 195, 18 May 2017, p.14, <http://www.institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/asylumdetentionineurope-walter-jdib-may2017.pdf?pdf=ok>, last accessed 20 March 2018. 36 As aptly stated by the Global Detention Project, “Greece’s immigration detention practices more generally raise several concerns, including: the country’s resistance to using alternatives to detention; its systematic detention of children; the issuing of detention orders that lack individual assessments; inadequate conditions of detention; and the use of police stations for immigration detention purposes”. Global Detention Project, ‘Greece Immigration Detention’ [online], Global Detention Project [website], January 2018 (updated), <https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/greece#_ftn8>, last accessed 20 March 2018. 37 Also see, European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ‘What's in a name? The reality of 21