of, the part of Greek society that has expressed itself through Golden Dawn will continue looking for a political outlet. This study does not cover ultra-right political culture in Greece in a general way, nor even Golden Dawn per se, but poses a simpler question: How is to be explained that Golden Dawn is being treated by the State as another organization in the mould of the “17 November” group, despite the obvious fact that the latter, quite unlike Golden Dawn, only operated for many years under cover of darkness and illegality? What are the ties, the inactions, the ideological or other mechanisms that for so long prevented the Greek State from doing its job with respect to an organization now all-too easily characterized as “criminal” under the relevant article of the penal code? For example, why must the minister in charge irst issue an order to the leadership of the Supreme Court before a criminal investigation can even begin? In the famous conclusion by the deputy public prosecutor at the Supreme Court, one reads that all it took to begin the recent anti-Golden Dawn mobilization was for a document to be sent over by the minister of public order and citizen protection (the latter being, again, the same person who a year earlier had announced his intent to sue The Guardian for the newspaper’s article on the torture of anarchists by police oicers with Golden Dawn sympathies or ailiations). The prosecution was also prompted by “a number of articles in various newspapers regarding the activities of the party Popular Association – Golden Dawn, which, according to the aforementioned ministerial report, exceed the limits of single events, provoke public morals, undermine the authority of the rule of law, ofend human rights and human dignity, endanger public order and the country’s internal security, and expose its democratic tradition and its legal culture as well as its obligations emanating from international and European law...” Why, then, did we have to reach that point? This is what the present study tries to explain, especially today, at a time when things appear to be changing. This study, again, was conceived and conducted before the turning point of autumn 2013, during the long period of State inaction attesting to acquiescence or even afiliation. This inaction was unbearable not simply because the criminal acts now being pursued in court are only a fraction of those that were actually perpetrated. Even more telling is that until recently the State made no efort to connect these crimes and to expose their organized and systematic character, although many loud and clear voices within Greek society were exposing the ugly reality through a series of books, analyses, reports, countless video documents, and political confessions. Additionally there were reports on racist violence by watchdog groups, ample coverage in the international press, and international expressions of concern about developments in Greece, where society appeared to be on the verge of open domestic conlict. From the other side, public immunity aforded much space for revealing expressions of racist hatred on the Web, disgusting statements in the Parliament, Nazi salutes, etc. All this did not require demonstration: it was commonly known and commonly experienced. What then are the emblematic moments of culmination and what are the subjects around which ultra-right pockets formed within the Greek State? How are these pockets interrelated, how do they reinforce each other? Are there mechanisms MAPPING ULTRA-RIGHT EXTREMISM, XENOPHOBIA AND RACISM WITHIN THE GREEK STATE APPARATUS |9