4/ NEO-FASCISM (ΙΙ): FROM THE TRANSITION UNTIL THE END OF THE COLD WAR Ater the Junta fell, the only State apparatus that was somewhat systematically subjected to investigation and prosecution was the military police with its Special Interrogation Unit (EAT-ESA), aterinitiatives on behalf of victims and international campaigns by human rights organizations12. Even in that case, however, punishment of the culprits remained incomplete. The Greek military police had been a rather exemplary mechanism of the “deep state”. Founded in 1951, it functioned as an elite corps of the hardest anti-communist cluster of military oicers, in collaboration with the State Intelligence Service (KYP). Ater the 1967 coup, it was progressively transformed into an extremely powerful paramilitary organization with thousands of members, informants, torturers, etc. During the general administrative purge ater the 1974 transition, the oicial strategy was to revoke appointments and to refer cases to special disciplinary boards. Beyond a limited number of dismissals and temporary removals, in the vast majority of these cases the supporters of the junta were let in place. Perhaps the only institutional exception was the university, where, under pressure from the student movement, a wide if still incomplete “dejuntaization” was implemented. Following the logic of the “Togliatti Amnesty” (1946) in Italy, the Third Greek Republic was formed on the basis of a reintegration of the Communist Party into the political system, compensated by amnesty and immunity for the wide social base of fascism/neo-fascism.13 Despite the diference of two decades, this historical analogy between the legitimization process in the parliamentary regimes of Italy and Greece helps explain the historical “dark side” ainities among the enemies of democracy. A thin red line connects the Greek ultra-right paramilitary forces with their Italian counterparts, in the context of NATO’s “Stay Behind” network ater the 1950s. These contacts proved valuable for the Greek ultraright directly ater the fall of the colonels’ junta, allowing it to exploit the “knowhow” of some of the leaders of the Italian neo-fascist organization Ordine Nuovo, who at the time were hiding in Greece in order to avoid prosecution by the Italian judiciary. Between 1976 and 1979, a network of ultra-right parastate organizations conducted dozens of bomb attacks in cinemas, bookstores, political bureaus, etc., aiming mostly at let-wing organizations and militants.14 The attitude of the authorities towards ultra-right terrorism cannot be seen as particularly harsh, since most cases were not solved and let pending, with only few exceptions. One of the most illuminating cases was that of Nikos Michaloliakos, the later leader of Golden Dawn. He was arrested as part of a group of 34 people for an assault against journalists, but never stood trial. In 1978, while he was serving in 12. 13. 14. On the irst torturers’ trial, cf. Amnesty International 1977. Cf. Pavone 1999. See http://www.efsyn.gr/?p=42906. MAPPING ULTRA-RIGHT EXTREMISM, XENOPHOBIA AND RACISM WITHIN THE GREEK STATE APPARATUS | 17