Detention as Punishment: Can indefinite detention be Greece's main policy tool to manage its irregular migrant population? by Anna Triandafyllidou, Angeliki Dimitriadi, Danai Angeli έaί to curb indiscriminate lodging of asίlum claims, as means of legalising one’s staί. In relation to the latter, recent findings 3 show that migrants are indeed discouraged from applying, since they are informed that detention time starts once more from zero, once they apply for asylum and until a final decision is reached on their application. Deterrence is not a standalone policy. In fact, it is complimented by return and increasingly linked with “άoluntarί” return, procedure initiated during detention often έith the assistance of IOM, έherebί the migrant is presented έith the alternatiάe to “go home” or remain in detention while his/her asylum claim is processed or travel documents are issued for removal. Because voluntary return means the migrant cooperates and embassies tend to also be more cooperative (when the individual wishes to return), it is also a more expedient process; however it has raised criticism as to what an eήtent it is “άoluntarί” and hoέ “sustainable” is the return (or έhether the migrant re-migrates upon return). As Claire de Senarclens argues 4 immigration detention is usually thought of as a way to facilitate the removal of illegally staying foreign nationals. However it is useful to distinguish between administrative detention, mainly aiming at guaranteeing that the individual is present when it comes to the execution of their removal, and the disciplinary function of detention, when it is thought of as an instrument of coercion for forcing people to cooperate for the purpose of their own removal. Indeed the distinction may be subtle but is real. There is a third type of detention: detention as sanction for having crossed the border unauthorized and/or for seeking asylum. This punishment dimension is used by governments to deter prospective irregular migrants from entering their territory or asylum seekers from applying for international protection. The latter is related to the view that applying for asylum actually stalls the removal procedure until the application is processed (which in countries like Greece for instance may take several years). There is a common agreement among scholars and NGOs that using detention in its disciplinary and punishment dimension is increasingly common in European countries. Relevant studies and NGO experiences documented in Forced Migration Review (fall 2013) note that there is a pressing need for assessing the costs (both direct in terms of lodging and policing detained people, and indirect in terms of the damage inflicted to these people έhose onlί crime is to haάe crossed the countrί’s borders unauthorized and/or haάing applied for asylum) of detention. In addition, the costs of detention need to be examined more closely. Recent studies5 have shown that Italy is spending a minimum of 55 million Euros per year for the functioning of its CIE centres (Centres for Identification and Expulsion). In the period between 1998 and 2012 nearlί 170,000 indiάiduals haάe been “hosted” at CIE but onlί 46.2% of them haάe been effectively removed from the Italian territory. In addition the Italian government has invested in the period 2005-2012 a total sum of 1.668 billion Euros (of which 1.3 billion contributed by the Italian state and 281.3 million from EU funds) with a dubious success in limiting the phenomenon of irregular migration. In addition the studies show that there is a lack of transparency on how policies are implemented and how money is spent. There is a lack of evaluation and assessment of the activities conducted and the expenses sustained. 3 See interviews with migrants in detention facilities, October-December 2013, in the framework of the IRMA project (http://irma.eliamep.gr/). 4 See Forced Migration Review, fall 2013, Issue 44, page 60. For more details see http://www.lunaria.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/SINTESI_COSTIDISUMANI_def.pdf and http://www.wisslab.dirpolis.sssup.it/files/2013/06/Libro-dirpolis-ita.pdf 5 6