Introduction Greece has been ground zero in Europe’s efforts to halt irregular migration for several years. At the same time, the country’s economic crisis has exasperated social divisions leading to increasing violence and hostility directed at foreigners. With massive financial and operational assistance provided by the European Union, Greece has confronted migratory pressures by emphasizing interdiction, detention, and removal. A 2013 Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) report summarized: “Greece has focused on reinforcing its external borders and started a policy which relies too heavily on detention. Despite the Greek authorities’ determination to improve the asylum system and detention conditions, which in many instances remain deplorable, much still needs to be done” (PACE 2013). Frontex, the EU’s border control agency, designates Greece’s border with Turkey as part of the “Eastern Mediterranean route,” one of seven irregular migratory routes into the EU identified by the agency. With 55,700 “detections” in 2010, 57,000 in 2011, and 37,224 in 2012, this route accounts for roughly half of all unauthorized entries annually. Nevertheless, since mid-2012 attempts to transit Greece have dropped off significantly (Frontex 2012b; 2013; 2014). In addition, in early 2014, the International Organisation for Migration announced that some 20,000 migrants had voluntarily departed Greece, resulting in the country’s first annual net outflow of migrants in 2013 (Alloush 2014). The movement of people into Greece has shifted numerous times in recent years, apparently in response to interdiction efforts. According to observers, it was not until 2008, after Spain and Italy had effectively blocked routes into their countries, that “Greece became the main gate of entry into the European Union” (PACE 2013). During 2007-2009 most irregular migrants reached Greece by way of the Aegean Islands. By early 2010, the main entry point had shifted to the Evros River between Greece and Turkey, where detections shot up to several tens of thousands a year (UNHCR-Greece 2012). At the same time, the region became notorious for the large number of people who have died trying to cross the river. Responding to the migratory pressures in Evros, Greece dramatically increased deployments of police in the region, put in place a range of surveillance and interdiction methods, and completed a 12.5-kilometer-long fence along the border. Also, between November 2010 and February 2011, Frontex made the debut deployment of its Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) (Frontex 2010; Frontex 2011a; Guild and Carrera 2012). As a result of the enhanced patrolling along the Evros, migrants shifted their focus back to the Aegean Islands (OHCHR 2012). In early 2014, Greece’s Marine Minister claimed “There is a daily battle in the Aegean Sea,” adding that the country had to “send a message that our borders are not an unfenced backyard” (ECRE 2014). The country has responded to this “battle” by pursuing a number of controversial practices, including pushbacks and round ups. In January 2014, an alleged pushback operation near 3