spectrum. This is why we do believe that the Greek judiciary is the main issue of this study of Greece today. This is not to say that the judiciary poses an exceptional danger to democracy, but that it reproduces judgments and views that consolidate a culture that may be convincingly shown to share most features of the ultra-right as the normative horizon (i.e., as the common view of what is just) of the Greek political community. As for the Hellenic Police, and notwithstanding the results of recent judicial and disciplinary actions taken against its oicials (whether high-ranked or not) as part of the efort to dismantle Golden Dawn, the present study inds it represents the sector of the State that is by far the most exposed to ultra-right intrusion. This, of course, should not come as a surprise, although today even the most sceptical observer may feel abashed by the degree to which the Hellenic Police is contaminated with Nazi enclaves. The very phrase “police erosion” is a commonplace even in mainstream currents of public speech, while confessions by the highest political actors have become common. Interestingly enough, not a single minister of public order during the crucial last three years has failed to admit in public (but only ater his incumbency) that there is indeed a major problem. Perhaps the one exception here is, to our knowledge, the only minister of public order in Greece since 1974 who was himself a former police oicial, during the “experts’ government” under Loukas Papadimos (late 2011 to early 2012). This could be attributed either to a strong esprit de corps towards his service, to a lack of political cynicism compared to all his other colleagues, or maybe to a combination of both. Due to the recent 20th century history of constitutional aberrations in Greece, the military takes on a relatively even greater historical and political signiicance in the context of our study. Twentieth century Greek political history constitutes a paradigmatic model of repeated interventions by the military in politics in coup d’état strategies of ultra-right inspiration and anti-communist ideology. Precisely because of this legacy, the Greek military since 1974 has displayed an exemplary behaviour of constitutional faith. Both its position within the State and its historical legacy do not leave any doubt about its faith in the Constitution. Indeed, this study shows that the military follows rather convincingly a recommended institutional approach regarding its position within the Greek State. However, even here there are cracks, and increasingly so as of late. Obviously, it goes without saying that ultra-right stains within the military (“droplets”, according to Evangelos Averof’s famous formulation soon ater 1974) never altogether disappeared or evaporated; nor could they. The deep ultra-right stains within the military were instead covered up and ultra-right voices were hushed. The transition to democracy and the consolidation of democracy ater 1974 have assured that the only institutionally recommended voice of the military lies in institutional silence. This has held until the present day, but with progressive bumps now at a high point, as seen in the chapter on the military. As the crisis progresses ever further in Greece, an increasing number of military oicers, including high-ranked ones, seem to slide, sometimes overtly, towards a view of the “salvation of the country” from a double enemy: irst and foremost, an external one, which, as Greek nationalism is keen on repeating, lurks whenever “our homeland is weak”; and, second, an internal one MAPPING ULTRA-RIGHT EXTREMISM, XENOPHOBIA AND RACISM WITHIN THE GREEK STATE APPARATUS |7