Slingenberg 383 The curfew enacted for asylum seekers contained in these centres entails that they cannot leave the centres between 8 pm and 8 am. There are three relevant differences between this curfew and the earlier mentioned examples. First of all its long duration (12 h). Secondly, and more significantly, the fact that this curfew is combined with the obligation to stay in a collective reception centre (instead of one’s own private home) in which far-reaching surveillance measures are employed. Thirdly, the fact that this curfew is imposed on an island, from which asylum seekers have no possibility to (safely) leave towards the Greek mainland without permission of the Greek authorities. See for an analysis of such residence restrictions for asylum seekers as a form of (legal) social control also the contributions of Leroy (2024) and Ruiz Ramos (2024b) in this issue. This article examines the gap between the lived experiences of asylum seekers subjected to this curfew, geographical restriction and surveillance on the one hand, and the legal qualification of these measures on the other. Based on existing empirical research into the Greek reception centres, it shows how its residents generally experience them as prisons. In addition, it shows how European courts and human rights institutions do not qualify the confinement of asylum seekers in reception centres where they can leave during the day as deprivation of liberty or detention. This has important consequences, as this means that the particular safeguards for people deprived of their liberty, as laid down in, for example, Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), do not apply. Article 5 ECHR provides the right to liberty and is considered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), together with articles 2 and 3, as one of the most fundamental human rights and of paramount importance (see e.g. Medvedyev and others v. France, 2010, para 76). It contains habeas corpus and other important procedural safeguards that do not explicitly apply under other human rights provisions. Habeas corpus is different from regular judicial review of state action, as it requires speedy access to a judge; the sole objective of the procedure is to release from unlawful detention; and the burden of proof lies on the authorities (Okpaluba and Nwafor, 2021: 55–67). In addition, Article 5 has no general limitation clause (different from, e.g. the right to freedom of movement or the right to respect for private life), so it is not possible to derogate from these procedural safeguards based on a balancing exercise between the interest of the state and those of the individual. The habeas corpus safeguard has been described as of ‘critical importance to the maintenance of the rule of law’ (Farrell, 2016: 223–253), as it is an ‘important check against an inordinate concentration of power in the executive branch��� (Clark, 2007) and as playing ‘an important role in maintaining the relationship between the executive branch and the law within the domestic legal framework’ (Farrell, 2016: 223–253). While other human rights do provide protection against containment measures that cannot be qualified as detention (e.g. the right to freedom of movement and the right to respect for private life, see Ruiz Ramos, 2024a; Slingenberg, 2022; Wessels, 2023), the relevance and exceptional nature of the protection provided by the right to liberty means that it is highly important to critically discuss the material scope of this right. This article argues how the interpretation of the material scope of Article 5 ECHR by human rights institutions and courts fits a standard (libertarian) concept of coercion. The