‘subjects’ of the motherland, migrants from the Commonwealth held British citizenship and had the free right to enter ‘the motherland’ until 1962. They were also given the right to vote in national elections, which certainly played into Labour’s decision to promote the first Race Relations Act in 1965.47 Although successive laws retrenched this right, the majority of long-term resident migrant workers from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean are citizens (and, in turn, most of their children). Ultimately, while resented in some quarters, the settlement of migrants was legitimised by the idea of the returning subject. Despite continuing tensions, there is a discursive framework for understanding Britain as a multiracial and multi-cultural. As a result, ‘police raids to find illegal immigrants and the demanding of passports from people long established in this country’ can be framed in terms of their inevitable damage to UK race relations.48 The German migration story is very different. Although Germany did have some colonies, they were not as extensive as Britain’s, largely due to the fact that the unification of Germany only took place in 1871. By the time the country joined the ‘Scramble for Africa’ most of the continent had already been colonised and the ones Germany managed were confiscated in the Treaty of Versailles in 1914. In contrast to British colonialism, citizens of German colonies in Togo, Cameroon and Namibia were not seen as subjects of the ‘Kaiser’: they were not able to move freely to the Reich and acquiring citizenship was near impossible because of the principle of blood descent in naturalisation law.49 This meant, instead of colonial legacy, the first mass migration came under the ruse of ‘Gastarbeiters,’ (guest workers) recruited to help with the post-war labour shortage, who were expected to leave no permanent mark on the host country.50 Despite the settlement of this group and other mass immigration movements following the breakdown of USSR, Germany continued to deny that it had become a ‘land of immigration’.51 In doing so, it excluded migrants from political debates and stymied wider discussions of race relations. The culture of antidiscrimination in Germany is generally weak.52 Another factor that legitimates racial profiling in Germany arises from the different understandings of what discrimination actually is. State discrimination is not 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. a developed topic in German public debate. This may seem surprising considering Germany’s history, but in fact the Holocaust plays a central role in this invisibility. In this first place, race is still a taboo subject. More importantly, however, is the way in which racism is understood mainly in the context of Anti-Semitism and fascism. As an antidiscrimination activist reminded me, “With the German history and the third Reich, the starting point with anything related to racism is right wing movements and fascism. So, it’s almost impossible to think in terms of racism outside of this. A racist is bald head with black shoes. It cannot be a normal person.” Thus, generous federal funding is available for fighting right wing extremism while racial profiling continues. However, the issue with ‘over identifying the fight against racism with the activities extremist groups is that...they are exceptional’.53 Racism can also be institutional; it can be every-day. Finally, the tightly co-ordinated political structure of Germany does not privilege the voices of dissenting outsiders. By contrast, a majoritarian and pluralist political system such as that in the UK encourages proactive lobbying from outside groups. For instance, the Liberty think tank was a key player in lobbying against Clause 28 (3) of the Immigration and Citizenship Bill 2008, which would have introduced general powers to ask for ID. German Federalism also inhibits efforts by anti-discrimination activists. As one respondent said, ‘With a federal system, you fight against 16 windmills... it’s just impossible!’ Imagining the complexity of tackling the original Schleierfahndung powers, defined and enforced differently across the Länder, illustrates this point. Conclusion The disparate histories of the UK and Germany make it unlikely that policy convergence will occur in the near future. Ultimately, the way each country perceives and manages their foreign citizens reflects a complex mix of past events, some which have very little to do with migration control at all. In turn, policies introduced for illegal migration can shape the way in which citizens — particularly those of ethnic minority background — are policed. Solanke, I. (2005) ibid. Immigration and Race Relations. HC Deb, 06 December 1973, vol. 865 cc1546-82. The Empire Citizenship Law of 1913 institutionalised blood descent as a central theme in the German nation-building project. The legacy of this policy is that Germany has one of the lowest naturalisation rates in Europe. Rist, R. (1978.) The guestworkers of Germany. Society 15:81-90. Joppke, C. (1999). Immigration and the Nation-State The United States, Germany and Great Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peucker, M. (2007). Equality and anti-discrimination approaches in Germany. European Forum for Migration Studies, University of Bamberg. Donald, J. et al. (1992). ‘Race’, culture and difference. London: Sage. Issue 205 Prison Service Journal 33