Carceral moderation and the Janus face of international pressure 51 human rights non-compliance by Western states, political commitment to human rights rules and norms is today on the wane internationally, just as it was once on the ascent. As has been vividly illustrated by research into the international spread of ‘clean’ torture techniques that leave no physical trace, the strength of the international human rights regime and its array of monitoring bodies has correlated more with the way in which Western states and their allies have chosen to execute their abusive practices, rather than with their level of compliance per se [78]. Over recent years, much has been written about the rise in overt violations of human rights conventions by Western states, relating both to counter-terrorism law and practices and the treatment of immigrants (see further, e.g., [79]). This upsurge in unconcealed violations has gone hand-in-hand with efforts to critique and curtail the reach of international human rights law; amongst EU member-states, for example, the ECtHR has been subject to mounting criticism for its alleged activism in its interpretation of the ECHR and for over-reaching the scope of its authority in an effort to extend its influence and reputation [80]. As Oomen [81] writes, B[a]fter decades of relatively undisputed expansion of the jurisdiction, caseload and normative reach of the [ECtHR], the past years have been marked by an explicit questioning – by politicians, lawyers and opinion-makers alike – of its legitimacy.^ This discourse has not merely been mirrored in Greece, it has also been used to question the validity of ECtHR rulings against Greece and the efforts of domestic lobbies who would cite such rulings in their campaigns for human rights reform in the country. Thus, for instance, in 2012, when challenged by a Greek interviewer to account for ECtHR rulings against Greece, the then Greek Minister of Public Order Nikos Dendias responded as follows: BThe first thing we should examine is how the Court judges and what decisions it reaches. The [European] Court of Human Rights has not only convicted Greece, it has convicted countless countries countless times. It has an expansionary tendency in the application of treaties, in a totally broadened manner, while the legal adequacy of its decisions […] opens up huge questions. […] The expansionary way of interpreting treaties, by people who are in many cases not legal professionals, and whose legal training in the philosophy of law is relatively limited, generates major issues, major issues in Greek Law, European Law, and Roman Law alike[.]^ [82] The extent to which states seek to demonstrate compliance with human rights rules and norms, then, is shaped by pressures beyond the nation-state itself; pressures that may be as much nurturing of non-compliance as they may be of compliance (see further [83, 84]). Greek patterns of non-compliance therefore need to be understood within a context in which there has been substantial and increasing permissiveness towards, and even encouragement of, the forms of abuse in which Greece has been engaged, providing the country with supportive cues for continuing abusive practices. Conclusion This article shows that calculations by Greek governments of costs and benefits relating to both the domestic and international arenas, in conjunction with select