effectiveness thus requires halting the influx towards Greece from the country of origin. Such information campaigns have been pioneered by the UK and Australia among other governments privileging in recent times the use of online media. This is an avenue worth exploring not only by Greece but by the entire EU.72 B. Apprehension: direct costs v. direct outputs In terms of detection and apprehension and direct outputs, between 2008 and 2013, the overall number of apprehensions in Greece did, indeed, decrease. Yet, it has increased again in the course of 2014. Table 9. Apprehensions of Irregular Migrants 2008-2014 Year Total Number of Apprehensions 2008 146,337 2009 126,145 2010 132,524 2011 99,368 2012 76,878 2013 43,002 2014 (Aug). 41,930 In order to evaluate the effectiveness of Greece's apprehension policy, it is not enough to merely look at the total number of apprehensions and its fluctuation. A decrease in arrivals is, as previously mentioned, due to a number of reasons, at times unrelated to Greece's migration policy (eg financial crisis, seasonal workers' agreement with Albania). Instead, we need to examine to what extent apprehension has served its main objective of return and as a second step, whether this was done in a cost-effective manner. This is a challenge since both costs and the necessary data against which this hypothesis may be tested, are only partially available. For instance, the rate of migrants who escape detection and 72 UK Home office, “Information dissemination to potential asylum seekers in countries of origin and transit”, Home Office Findings 220, London: UK Home Office, 2014; Khalid Koser and Marie McAuliffe (2013) Establishing an Evidence-Base for Future Policy Development on Irregular Migration to Australia, June 2013, Occasional Paper, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Government. Page 35