Thus, the relations of the Church of Greece with the ultra-right do not have any other particular characteristics besides the Church’s close ties with the Greek State. As a rule, the more right-wing the State, the more right-wing the Church. On the other hand, when the State deviates from right-wing views and introduces ideas and proposals that threaten the status quo according to the Church, then the Church tries to bring the State back to the conservative route, occasionally by turning its ideological wheel to the ultra-right. A crucial moment in which the Church of Greece almost cut loose from the mainstream political speech of the State was the so-called “modernization” period of social democracy, when K. Simitis was Prime Minister (1996-2004), exactly because it felt that the principles and values that it allegedly protects were threatened. During those four years, which culminated in the famous “identity cards afair” (2000), the Church appeared to stray from its long-term strategy of consensus, mostly because of the personality of the then archbishop, who basically went all political through his ecclesiastic oice. While it is easy to ile Christodoulos’ speech under what contemporary scholarship considers as ultra-right, one should not forget that essentially the archbishop’s goal back then was to retain the Church’s privileges in relation to the Greek State; he was mostly driven by political expediency, not long-term ecclesiastical strategies. This is what is most important regarding the ultra-right iniltration of the ecclesiastical speech. The identity cards afair in 2000 was a victory, albeit a Pyrrhic one, of the Greek State in a strange and historically unprecedented arm wrestling with ecclesiastical leadership. Aterwards, not only were the privileges of the Church not limited, but they were expanded as the State looked for ways to appease the ecclesiastical bellwethers, part of whom were following a course of structural opposition to the government at the time. During that time, the Church of Greece claimed the role of an autonomous and selfreliant political exponent, as it probably felt that its role was being questioned. The political cowardice that characterized mostly the second four-year term of Simitis’ government, ater the identity cards afair, actually encouraged the most extreme voices within the Church of Greece, who felt free not only to express themselves, but also to set their own particular agenda in political speech. The basic problem, then, is the virtually acquired right of the oicials of a State Church to have an opinion on everything, which is also based on the fact of their lifelong tenure in their oice, although they are State employees. The result is a speech that occasionally goes beyond what is acceptable, in matters privileged by the ultra-right, i.e. hardcore nationalism and even crude racism. The overall role of the Church as an institution that efects a mitigation of severe social sufering in the years to come, as well as the special position that ultra-right bishops may be able to assume in this process, will be a trial that will determine the inal outcome. MAPPING ULTRA-RIGHT EXTREMISM, XENOPHOBIA AND RACISM WITHIN THE GREEK STATE APPARATUS | 93