care led these minors to follow the same Balkan route with their adult co-travellers, with the risks for exploitation and further victimisation being apparent. To the contrary, during the following period, with the revival of the policies that led towards the restriction of liberty, the corresponding treatment of the minors was subsequently affected, held even in police stations in light of course of the protective custody. The political choice, despite being a short-term arduous and demanding process, has the advantage that in the midterm it is proven effective and productive. This is because it contains both the information and the prospect. Thus, the Administration is implementing a clear plan, with specific goals and time schedules, and is evaluated based on results. The local society as well as anyone participating in the public debate, from the media to the church, know about the plan and the objectives pursued, and are clearly more accepting and cooperative, since they are not in danger of surprises. The central administration had and continues to have a big part of the responsibility regarding the failure to plan and the shortcomings in the organisation. On the other side, the EU, and specifically its primary political instrument, the Council, did not appear to realise in time the magnitude of the challenge. The absence here as well of a clear political choice and corresponding planning, was more than obvious, because the leadership of many Member States was watching with anxiety or even terror, the thousands of people struggling to cross the so-called Balkan Route. And thus, first the borders were closed and then they all started to look for solutions. The prevalent political choice in the EU appears to be reflexive, and substantially focused on one goal: deterrence. From the European Agenda for migration in the first half of 2015, to the EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 2016, the main objective appears to be the prevention of the mass movement of migrant and refugee populations to Europe. In the European agenda for migration on 13.5.2015, the specific and immediate actions which the European Commission was called upon to implement, were linked in principle with the protection of the sea borders and combating human trafficking.266 This preclusive logic also encompasses the announcement of the reinforcement of the role of FRONTEX in return issues. The logic of the hotspots, as nodal points of reception and control of the mass arrivals, in Lampedusa, or in five crucial islands from the aspect of inflows in Greece, essentially prepared the policy for the control of the EU sea borders which was jointly declared with Turkey on 18.3.2016 and aims to deter the wave of the incoming arrivals through their prompt readmission to Turkey. In this framework, the Greek services were essentially called upon to consider Turkey as a safe (or not) third country for asylum applicants. The main goal of the Statement, regardless of any other dysfunctions, was to reduce the mass inflows at the sea borders of the Aegean, which is an effect that was being reported since April 2016. However, the institutions and the Member States of the most prosperous and politically developed union should provide political solutions and respond to the challenges under the terms of the rule of law and the protection of human rights. The political leadership of the EU Member States, with few exceptions, displayed weak reflexes, undertaking timid commitments (acceptance of settlement of a few tens of thousands of refugees), attempting institutional acrobatics, such as the so-called EU-Turkey Statement, and essentially recommending to assign the handling of the problem to the first-line Member States, such as Greece and Italy. The recommendation included the deterrence of the migrant and refugee flows with the help of NATO and FRONTEX and the return of those third-country nationals who managed to cross the borders, either to their home country or Turkey, in exchange of monetary compensation and the material and technical support of the Member States that are in the socalled first line. Up to the beginning of 2017 when this report was being prepared, Greece appeared, at least in practice, to have accepted this role without the intention of formulating and implementing a policy with separate distinct goals. The Greek Ombudsman, with the mandates granted by the State, as an independent authority that promotes and protects human rights in general, and also children rights, as a national mechanism for the prevention of torture and abuse, and as a national mechanism for the external monitoring of the return operations of third-country nationals, will continue to closely monitor the management of the refugeemigrant issue in Greece. It furthermore reserves the right to return with a new investigation, covering the issue in total or specific aspects of it. 266 Reinforcement of the FRONTEX “Triton” and “Poseidon” operations, an operation in the Mediterranean for the dismantling of the rings of illegal trafficking of migrants and the fight against human trafficking according to international law. 93